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Abstract
Consider a one step forward looking model where agents have beliefs about the law of
motion of the system, and their forecast for the next period is made with knowledge of the
past values of the state variable but not the current value, and is allowed to depend on the
current realization of an extrinsic random process. The paper provides (and characterizes)
the conditions for the existence of sunspot equilibria for the model described.
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1. Introduction
This paper is about the existence of sunspot equilibria, i.e., stochastic equilibria
driven purely by extrinsic uncertainty. We specify a class of stochastic equilibria
that we name functional sunspot equilibria (henceforth, FSE); these are self-fulfilling
equilibria in which expectation formation is assumed to be determined by functions
that agents believe map the value of the state variable at a date to its value at
the subsequent date.3 One of a finite number of functions is chosen depending
on the realization of a finite state stationary Markov process that models extrinsic
uncertainty, and, in every Markov state, the actual function linking the state vari-
able across two successive periods is required to coincide with the agents’ believed
function.4 We show that this formulation, whereby agents form forecasts based on a
systematic relationship between past and present prices with the proviso that their
beliefs about the functioning of the economy may be aﬀected by extrinsic uncer-
tainty, has important implications for the existence of equilbria. FSE turn out to
be the stochastic counterparts of nonstationary perfect foresight paths; they exist
quite generally and provide a simple route to very rich stochastic dynamic behaviour
with a parsimonious parameterization. Evidently, our work adds to the scope for
multiplicity of rational expectations equilibria already identified in the literature.
Much of the existing literature on sunspot equilibria in dynamic economic models
provides results on a narrow class of equilibria that have been called finite state
stationary sunspot equilibria (henceforth, FSSE). These are equilibria in which the
agents’ belief about the value of the state variable is a function of only the current
realization of the extrinsic state where the extrinsic state is assumed to follow a
finite state stationary Markov process. Most studies on FSSE are in the framework
of the basic Overlapping Generations model (henceforth, OLG) with two period lived
agents, one consumption good and a constant stock of money (see, e.g., Azariadis
(1981), Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986), Grandmont (1986), Guesnerie (1986) and
Peck (1988)). It is well known that the existence of FSSE is intimately tied to
the existence of a certain kind of invariant set in the perfect foresight dynamics of
the deterministic model, a condition that can be related to the indeterminacy of
the steady state; in particular, in the basic OLG model, FSSE do not exist when
demand functions have the gross substitutes property.
Evidently, one can think of more general definitions of sunspot equilibrium.
Woodford (1986) studies sunspot equilibria that are stationary stochastic processes
3The sunspot equilibria for a linear OLG model discussed in Shell (1977) had a similar feature.
4So FSE are stationary Markov equilibria.
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and, as an application, he shows that they exist in the multigood OLG model where
FSSE exist only in nongeneric cases, while Woodford (1994) considers equilibria that
need not even be stationary.5 Such analyses have had less impact when compared
to FSSE probably because of the simplicity of FSSE. A diﬀerent equilibrium notion
has been considered by Chiappori and Guesnerie (1993) under the name “random
walk” equilibria. These are equilibria in which the state variable follows a random
walk on a countable state space and the limits of the trajectories, taken with respect
to the index of the elements of the state space, are steady states of the model. Most
of their analysis is geared towards the basic OLG model and they show that such
equilibria can exist in the gross substitutes case. Again, random walk equilibria can
be quite complicated; furthermore, they require the existence of two or more steady
states.
In an FSE, the agents’ belief at date t about the value of the state variable at date
t is determined by both the current realization of the sunspot state (denoted st) and
by the value of the state variable at date t− 1 (denoted xt−1), i.e., xet = h(xt−1; st).
These beliefs are extrapolated one step forward to predict xt+1 which, in conjunction
with the market clearing conditions, determine xt, the market clearing value of the
state variable at date t. That expectations be self-fulfilling requires that, for each
state s, the induced market clearing value xt equal h(xt−1; s).
Evidently, the building block for FSE are belief functions that are “backward
looking.” Our motivation for such a specifiaction is two fold. Firstly, the formulation
we consider arises naturally in markets where agents are required to act (place
demands) before the actual prices at which trade is carried out is available and where
the market clearing price is determined on the basis of the expressed demands, e.g.,
trading in mutual funds provides an instance where the actual trade often takes place
at prices quoted at the end of the trading day after the agents have placed their
demands. The simplest way to close such a model is to postulate that agents beliefs
about the functioning of the economy are summarized by a functional relationship
between the past and the current prices, i.e., a backward looking belief function,
which is then extrapolated one period ahead to generate forecasts; also, this is
5A important strand in the literature started with Woodford (1986) and focuses on the relation
between determinacy of the steady state and the existence of Markovian stationary sunspot equi-
libria without the restriction that the support be finite, i.e., a generalization of FSSE, in general
models with many goods with predetermined variables; Bloise (2003) is a recent example of such
work.
In the case of the basic OLG model, a generalization of FSSE to Markov processes with a
compact state space and strictly positive and continuous transitions in the OLG model is available
in Grandmont (1986); the nature of the existence result, however, remains the same as in the finite
state case.
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the route followed in earlier work that studies the issue of convergence to rational
expectations equilibria in such models.6 The second motivation is somewhat more
conceptual and stems from the manner in which one chooses to impose the axiom of
self-fulfilling expectations on the economy. In principle, one may impose the axiom
of self-fulfilling expectations directly on sequences of forecasts without necessarily
specifying where these forecasts come from; FSSE is a case in point where the
consistency condition one imposes on the agents’ beliefs xs is that it clears the
market in period t, where s is the state in period t, and the story accompanying
the formation of beliefs is: Before going to the market at date t, agents observe st,
the sunspot realization at date t, and predict the next period’s price distribution
conditional on this observation. Our formulation is conceptually very diﬀerent since
it looks at cases where these forecasts can be attributed to a “theory” that agents
have about the functioning of the economy, and then requires the theory to be self-
fulfilling. The gain from such a method is that one can then understand the axiom
of self-fulfilling expectations in terms of a correct theory that agents have about the
process generating the dynamics of the economy. We show that this rudimentary way
of incorporating the fact that agents form forecasts based on systematic relationship
between the past and present has important implications when one considers the
possibility that these theories might be aﬀected by extrinsic uncertainty.
We concentrate on the specific case of nonlinear one step forward looking self-
referential models with a one dimensional state variable, a specification which in-
cludes the basic OLG model. We provide an existence result for FSE after which
6The postulate that belief functions be “backward looking” is essential to obtaining well defined
sequences of temporary equilibria with self-fulfilling expectations in situations where the agents
use a functional representation to form expectations. In order to obtain a unique temporary
equilibrium at date t, it is imperative to “tie down” the forecast xet+1 and a well documented
feature of temporary equilibrium models shows that the only way to do so is to look backwards
and specify xet+1 as a function of the past of the economy. We recall an argument from Grandmont
and Laroque (1991) to illustrate this point. Assume that forecasts are point forecasts, that there is
no uncertainty, and that the market clearing relation is given by T (xt, x
e
t+1) = 0 with T (x¯, x¯) = 0.
Under the regularity condition that the partial derivative of T with respect to the first argument
evaluated at x¯ does not vanish, one can find a belief function h(x) that is well defined and unique
around x¯ and which satisfies T (h(x), x) = 0 for all x in some neighborhood of x¯. Hence, it is
impossible to define a unique temporary equilibrium fully determined by the current value of the
state variable xt since, at date t, each x in an open set can serve as an temporary equilibrium
with self-fulfilling expectations. So it is natural to set xet+1 = h(h(xt−1)), as in models of learning,
e.g., Marcet and Sargent (1989), Grandmont and Laroque (1991), obtaining thereby a unique
temporary equilibrium at date t, since xt−1 is a predetermined variable, and generate well defined
sequences of temporary equilibria with self-fulfilling expectations. The problem outlined above does
not show up in the case of FSSE since there the equilibrium notion associates to each state s a
unique constant xs thus tying down x
e
t+1 via xs(t). Since we consider more general state dependent
self-fulfilling functions, we run into the diﬃculty sketched above unless the belief functions are
“backward looking”.
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we examine them in greater detail in the canonical model in which, traditionally,
sunspot equilibria have been analyzed–the basic OLG model. We find that a nec-
essary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of FSE is that the Markov transition
matrix be singular and that there exist a set of values for the state variable in which
the perfect foresight dynamics are well defined and the set is invariant in the “for-
ward” dynamics.7 When the existence result is applied to the OLG case it shows
that FSE exist for all parameter configurations; in particular, we obtain existence
in the gross substitutes case where, as noted earlier, FSSE do not exist. We also
obtain FSE when a critical cycle of period two exists, a case where FSSE need not
exist.8 For pedagogical reasons we also study FSE in a linear formulation which,
because of its simplicity, gives insight into the nature of the more general problem
(FSSE have also been studied in a linear framework by, e.g., Chiappori, Geoﬀard
and Guesnerie (1991)). Of course, in the linear case too we find that FSE exist
for all parameter configurations, in particular, for configurations under which the
perfect foresight dynamics diverge from the steady state so that the steady state
is determinate, a case where FSSE do not exist. We stress, however, that in those
cases where FSE exist but FSSE do not, e.g., the gross substitutes case of the basic
OLG model, we are unable to show the existence of permanent oscillations with a
uniform lower bound on the amplitude, i.e., the FSE trajectories are random but
appear to converge to a constant value with probability one.
In comparing FSE and FSSE, note that the latter appear as special cases of
our formulation where the state dependent belief functions reduce to statewise con-
stants; naturally, conditions under which FSSE exist are more demanding than those
for FSE. FSE exist much more generally and display substantially richer stochas-
tic dynamic behaviour and, in the absence of extrinsic uncertainty, FSE coincide
with possibly nonstationary perfect foresight solutions of the model (while FSSE
coincide with stationary solutions). Also, since the indeterminacy of a steady state
implies the existence of an invariant set in the forward perfect foresight dynamics,
our analysis provides a direct route to the conjecture that if the steady state is inde-
terminate then simple sunspot equilibria do exist even though FSSE need not exist.
In eﬀect, we provide a generalization of FSSE and, as a consequence, we show that
7The relevance of some kind of invariance property for the perfect foresight dynamics for the
existence of sunspot equilibria is a common feature and has appeared in the literture. A well
known suﬃcient condition for the existence of FSSE and its generalization to an arbitrary number
of states is that the invariant set include the steady state in its relative interior, a property that is
guaranteed when the steady state is indeterminate.
8See Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986) or Grandmont (1986). The existence of a critical cycle of
period two is a nongeneric phenomenon.
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the problem of multiplicity of rational expectations equilibria may be considerably
more severe than believed based on the analysis of FSSE.
In the OLG framework, FSE can be thought of as a simpler way of obtaining
the behaviour that Chiappori and Guesnerie (1993) induced through their random
walk equilibria though the two existence results are quite diﬀerent at first sight.9
Also, in work done independently of the research reported in this paper, Magill and
Quinzii (2003) propose an equilibrium concept that, in the special case of extrinsic
uncertainty, coincides with FSE.10 Our focus is diﬀerent from theirs and so is our
existence result which brings out the importance of the singularity of the transition
matrix when uncertainty is extrinsic; when comparing our results with the analysis in
Magill and Quinzii (2003), one can interpret our result on the role of the singularity
of the transition matrix as yet another way in which sunspot equilibria are singular
cases.
We remark that an infinite time horizon is essential to obtaining FSE since the
dynamics of the state variable inherently depend on the past value of the state
variable through functions that are state dependent and self-fulfilling; it follows
that the sunspot equilibria in the canonical two period model (Cass and Shell 1983)
cannot be obtained as FSE. We mention two issues that require further investigation.
The welfare properties of FSSE are easily studied and it is known that they are ex-
ante ineﬃcient while their optimality properties under a weaker (conditional) notion
of optimality is easily checked using the “unit root property” due to Aiyagari and
Peled (1991); in the case of FSE, while it is easy to show that they too are ex-
ante ineﬃcient, their welfare properties under a conditional notion of optimality
are not clear since they induce nonstationary paths and an answer requires the use
of the criterion for optimality developed by Chattopadhyay and Gottardi (1999)
and poses an interesting challenge. Also, the precise relation between FSE and the
more general class of sunspot equilibria studied by Woodford (1986) and Woodford
9In addition to requiring that there be two steady states, the existence of random walk equilibria
also imposes conditions on the transition probabilities of a random walk money supply where
money transfers are proportional. Chiappori and Guesnerie (1993) do not discuss the possibility
of obtaining random walk equilibria with a deterministic money supply and “sunspot” induced
random prices. This should be possible but it is not obvious.
10They consider a one good OLG model with stochastic endowments and the gross substitutes
case. They argue in favour of equilibria built around a stationary expectation function and derive
the invariance requirement as a necessary condition. They show that such equilibria exist in large
numbers and they provide a condition under which all trajectories converge to one or the other
strongly stationary equilibrium which is the analogue of the two steady states in the deterministic
case. They note that their equilibrium concept also applies to the case of extrinsic uncertainty
proving existence even though FSSE do not exist in their specification due to the gross substitutes
property.
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(1994) and the random walk equilibria studied by Chiappori and Guesnerie (1993)
pose interesting questions.
Section 2 of the paper introduces FSE, provides an existence result, and relates
FSE to SSE and other equilibrium concepts of the sunspot type. Section 3 applies
the analysis to the OLG setting and to a linear model. Section 4 concludes the
paper.
2.1 Functional Sunspot Equilibria
Consider a deterministic economic model where the state variable is one dimen-
sional. xt, the equilibrium value of the state variable at date t, is determined given
xet+1, the value of the state variable expected to prevail the next period, according
to a functional relationship:
V (xet+1) = U(xt), (1)
where xt ∈ X, the state space with X ⊂ R, and xet+1 ∈ R. Let H(x) denote the set
of values of xe that solve (1) for each value of x; in words, H(x) is the set of beliefs
that rationalize the choice x. As x varies in X, a correspondence H is generated.
In order to proceed further, we need to specify a rule by which xet+1 is deter-
mined. Let us assume that the information structure that agents are assumed to
have access to does not contain the current value of the state variable. Hence, the
forecasting scheme employed by agents cannot depend on the current value of the
state variable. As discussed in the introduction, this leads us naturally to the use
of a forecasting process that is “backward looking” as in earlier work that studies
the issue of convergence to rational expectations equilibria in such models.11
So suppose that agents believe that the law of motion for the state variable takes
the form xt+1 = h(xt) for xt ∈ D where D ⊂ X. In our framework, this induces
beliefs about future values of the state variable according to xet+1 := h(xt) for xt ∈ D.
Since xt is not known when the forecast is made, one has
xet+1 = h(h(xt−1)). (2)
We would like the beliefs of the agents to be “consistent”, i.e., correctly specified.
Since the agent uses (2) to form her forecast, and the true value of xt is determined
according to (1), the consistency condition is modelled by requiring that the believed
law of motion be validated, that is, xt = h(xt−1) for xt−1 ∈ D, so that
11See, e.g., Marcet and Sargent (1989) for a linear model. There the parameter β in the equation
xt = βxt−1 is estimated at date t using values of x observed upto and including date t− 1 so that
the estimate is independent of the xt value that it determines. This simplifies considerably the
dynamic law of the model and stems from a feature of temporary equilibrium models alluded to
in the introduction, namely, that existence of equilibria and the analysis of dynamics is rather
problematic when current values of the state variable aﬀect the forecasts.
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V (h(h(xt−1))) = U(h(xt−1)) for all xt−1 ∈ D.
We say that the forecasting function h is self-fulfilling on D if
V (h(h(x))) = U(h(x)) for all x ∈ D.
Evidently, the requirement that h be self-fulfilling is met if h(x) ∈ D for all x ∈ D
and h is a selection from H. Conversely, if h is self-fulfilling then the fact that
U(h(x)) must be well defined implies that h(x) ∈ X for all x ∈ D, while the fact
that V (h(h(x))) is well defined implies that h(h(x)) is well defined so that h(x) ∈ D
must also hold, and, in addition, h must be a selection from H.
We say that D is invariant for h if x ∈ D ⇒ h(x) ∈ D.
We have shown that h is self-fulfilling on D if and only if D and h are such that
x ∈ D ⇒ h(x) ∈ D and V (h(x)) = U(x) for all x ∈ D, (3)
so that D is invariant for h and h is a selection from H.
With the groundwork in the deterministic case behind us, we can turn to the
subject matter of this paper, the stochastic case. We wish to permit the possibility
that agents believe that the realizations of a random process aﬀects the law of motion
of the economy. Specifically, we assume that agents observe a finite N state Markov
Chain taking values µs, s = 1, · · · , N , with transition matrix Π (with typical entry
πij the probability of transiting to state j next period conditional on being in state
i in the current period). Without loss of generality, we set µs = s.
Consider the information structure wherein, at date t, agents have information
upto date t− 1 on the state variable and also know the realization of the sunspot at
date t, denoted st. They believe that the law of motion for the state variable takes
the form xt+1 = h(xt; st+1) so that the realization st+1 aﬀects the function taking
xt to xt+1. The beliefs about future values of the state variable are now induced
according to xet+1 = h(xt; st+1) for xt ∈ D. The method for forecasting is the natural
extension of the deterministic case as described in (2): At date t, agents forecast
xt+1 before they observe xt and st+1 and so the forecast is given by a random variable
conditional on xt−1 and st
xet+1 = h(h(xt−1; st); st+1) for xt ∈ D. (4)
We wish to impose a natural consistency requirement on the beliefs of agents,
namely, that the state dependent belief functions be self-fulfilling. The requirement
is that when (4) is used to form forecasts, and when xt is determined by solvingPN
st+1=1
πstst+1V (h(h(xt−1; st); st+1)) = U(xt),
the stochastic analogue of (1), then xt+1 = h(xt; st+1) is validated for all xt ∈ D and
every state s = 1, · · · , N .
This leads us to say that the forecasting functions h(·; s), s = 1, · · · , N , are
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self-fulfilling on D in the stochastic case ifPN
j=1 πsjV (h(h(x; s); j)) = U(h(x; s)), for all x ∈ D and for all s = 1, · · · , N .
As in the deterministic case, the functions h(·; s), s = 1, · · · , N , are self-fulfilling
on D in the stochastic case if and only if
x ∈ D ⇒ h(x; s) ∈ D and PNj=1 πsjV (h(x; j)) = U(x), s = 1, · · · , N . (5)
It is obvious that (5) can have trivial solutions in which uncertainty plays no
role. We say that a set of forecasting functions h(x; s), s = 1, · · · , N , leads to a
nondegenerate solution if
for some x ∈ D and some s = 1, · · · , N , V (h(x; s))− U(x) 6= 0.
We define a finite state functional sunspot equilibrium (FSE) as a nondegerate
solution of the system (5).
Remark 1: In reading (5) one notices that the description given is time invari-
ant. However, when we construct trajectories that satisfy (5), time subscripts
necessarily enter and the correct way of specifying trajectories is by using the
rule xt = h(xt−1; st). One could consider an “alternative” specification in which
the agents’ model is that the law of motion for the state variable takes the form
xt+1 = h(xt; st) in which case instead of (5) we get the condition
x ∈ D ⇒ h(x; s) ∈ D and PNj=1 πsjV (h(x; s)) = U(x), s = 1, · · · , N ,
an equation whose only nontrivial stochastic solutions are randomizations over the
set H(x). Our specification of the timing is the only one that permits interesting
stochastic solutions.
2.2 Existence
With our equilibrium notion in place, we can state and prove an existence result.
We provide a constructive proof to show that if we have a pair D and h where D
is a non-degenerate interval that is invariant for h and h is a selection from H, and
if the image of D under the composition of V with h is a non-degenerate interval,
then FSE exist whenever the transition matrix Π is singular.
Proposition 1: Assume that there exists a pair D and h, where D is a non-
degenerate interval, such that x ∈ D ⇒ h(x) ∈ D and V (h(x)) = U(x) for all
x ∈ D, and that V (h(D)), the image of D under the composition of V with h, is a
non-degenerate interval. Then, for any N > 1 and any Π which is singular, an FSE
exists.
Proof: Let Z := {z ∈ RN : Π · z = 0N , k z k= 1}. Since Π is singular, Z 6= ∅.
Suppose that z˜ ∈ Z is such that all the coordinates take the same value. Since
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PN
j=1 πsj = 1 for all s = 1, · · · , N , we must have Π · z˜ = z˜. But then z˜ ∈ Z only if
z˜ = 0N contradicting the fact that 0N /∈ Z. It follows that if z ∈ Z, then zi 6= zj for
some i, j. Furthermore, Max{z1, · · · , zN} > 0 and Min{z1, · · · , zN} < 0.
Set V D := supx∈DV (h(x)) and V D := infx∈DV (h(x)). By hypothesis (V D, V D) 6=
∅. Also set fD := {x ∈ D : V (h(x)) ∈ (V D, V D)}. Since Z 6= ∅ and (V D, V D) 6= ∅,
for any ξ : D→ Z, there exists α such that
V D−V (h(x))
Max{ξ1(x),···,ξN (x)} > α(x) >
V D−V (h(x))
Max{ξ1(x),···,ξN (x)} for all x ∈
fD
V D−V (h(x))
Min{ξ1(x),···,ξN (x)} > α(x) >
V D−V (h(x))
Min{ξ1(x),···,ξN (x)} for all x ∈
fD.
α(x) 6= 0 for all x ∈ fD,
α(x) = 0 for all x ∈ D/fD.
Also, since ξ(x) ∈ Z and α(x) ∈ R, Π · α(x)ξ(x) = 0N .
By construction,
V D > α(x)ξs(x) + V (h(x)) > V D for all x ∈ fD and s = 1, 2, · · · , N ,
and at least one of the inequalities is strict if x ∈ D/fD.
Since V (h(D)) contains (V D, V D), for y ∈ (V D, V D) there exists x ∈ D such that
V (h(x)) = y; denote by V −1D (y) such a value of h(x). Define the belief functions
h(x; s) := V −1D (α(x)ξs(x) + V (h(x))) for all x ∈ D and s = 1, 2, · · · , N .
By construction, the functions h(·; s) are all well defined and for every s = 1, · · · , N ,
h(x; s) ∈ D for all x ∈ D so that the invariance condition holds.
Also, since
V (h(x; s)) = α(x)ξs(x) + V (h(x)) for all x ∈ D and s = 1, 2, · · · , N ,
and Π · α(x)ξ(x) = 0N , it follows thatPN
j=1 πsjV (h(x; j)) =
PN
j=1 πsjα(x)ξj(x) + (
PN
j=1 πsj)V (h(x))
= V (h(x)) for all x ∈ D and s = 1, 2, · · · , N . (6)
We proceed to check that (5) holds for the functions h(·; s) as defined. Since we
started with a pair D and h where D is invariant for h and h is a selection from H,
(3) holds, which, when combined with (5) leads toPN
j=1 πsjV (h(x; j)) = V (h(x)) for all x ∈ D and s = 1, · · · , N
which is (6). The property α(x) 6= 0 for all x ∈ fD guarantees that the solution we
have constructed is non-degenerate. This completes the proof of the proposition.
Remark 2: The construction in the proof above shows that FSE exist in abundance
since there is a lot of flexibility in specifying the functions ξ and α. It is possible
to extend the construction of the proof to cases where V (h(D)) is not an interval
by specifying the functions ξ and α appropriately. Also, it is worth noting that
diﬀerentiability assumptions play no role in our existence result.
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We turn to a result which is in the nature of a necessary condition that is implied
by the existence of an FSE. We do not emphasize the invariance properties that the
forecasting functions must satisfy since these have been observed for related concepts
in earlier literature (see, e.g., Grandmont (1986)); instead we focus on what is new
about FSE.
Proposition 2: If an FSE exists for Π then Π must be singular.
The proof of Proposition 1 is trivial: Use the fact that Π is a stochastic matrix
to conclude that, since an FSE is a nondegenerate solution of the system (5), Z 6= ∅
where Z := {z ∈ RN : Π · z = 0N , k z k= 1}. It follows that Π is singular.
It is straight forward to show the following implication of Proposition 2.
Corollary 1: If an FSE exists for Π then there exists an FSE for the same economy
and Π˜ where the rows of Π˜ are identical; in particular, if N = 2 then the rows of
Π are identical. One can therefore always sustain extrinsic uncertainty via an i.i.d.
process.
2.2 FSE in relation to FSSE
The most general notion of a sunspot equilibrium that one can consider is that
of a stochastic process for x driven by present and past realizations of extrinsic
uncertainty which satisfies an equation system that can be derived from (1). That,
of course, is too general to tell us much unless we look at the very special case
of low dimensional linear models. Therefore, particular emphasis has been placed
on sunspot models in which the induced process for x is suﬃciently simple which
usually means, as noted in the introduction, that FSSE are considered so that the
sunspot process is taken to be a time homogeneous Markov process with a finite
number of states and the realizations of x depend only on the current realization of
the sunspot. More formally, an FSSE for Π is a vector (x1, · · · , xN) such thatPN
j=1 πsjV (xj) = U(xs), s = 1, · · · , N .
It is evident that FSSE and FSE are very diﬀerent objects even though, at a
formal level, FSSE can be obtained as a special case of FSE by restricting h to take
the form h(x; s) = xs, a fixed value independent of x.
The formulation of FSE, and their existence under the fairly general conditions
as established by Proposition 1, derives from the requirement that the agents are
backward looking and at date t predict xt+1 on the basis of xt−1 and the sunspot
variable. This corresponds to analysing a case where agents forecasts are not time
invariant statewise constants but functions that map past states into future ones and
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the motivation behind such a formulation presented in the introduction was in terms
of the information structure. Clearly, FSE and FSSE are conceptually very diﬀerent
and the diﬀerence can be traced to diﬀerences in the formulation of the information
structure that lies behind each of them. The diﬀerence in the concepts shows up
as a diﬀerence in the conditions for existence; in the case of FSSE, one needs an
invariant set whose existence is guaranteed under very special circumstances (we
postpone the details to the next section since most of the results for FSSE were
obtained within the framework of the OLG model).
The random walk equilibria proposed by Chiappori and Guesnerie (1993) is yet
another notion of a sunspot equilibrium which we discuss in the next section since
most of their analysis is geared towards the OLG model.
3.1 An Overlapping Generations Formulation
In this section we apply our results to the basic OLG model. We also relate
FSE to results on FSSE and random walk equilibria in the overlapping generations
model.
Consider the standard OLG model with two period lived agents, one perishable
commodity and a constant stock of fiat money. The utility function of an agent is
denoted u(c1)+v(c2) where c1, c2 are consumption when young and old respectively.
Endowments are ω1,ω2 respectively. The stock of money is normalized to unity.
The following standard assumptions will be made
A.1: u and v are continuous on [0,+∞) and twice continuously diﬀerentiable on
(0,+∞) with u0 > 0, v0 > 0, limz→0u0(z) = +∞, limz→0v0(z) = +∞, u00 < 0, v00 < 0.
Furthermore, ω1 > 0, ω2 > 0. Finally,
u0(ω1)
v0(ω2)
< 1 so we are in the Samuelson case.
We formulate the dynamics of the model in terms of the level of real balances,
i.e., by the inverse of the price of the consumption good with the price of money
normalized to one. This normalized price is denoted x.
Denote V (x) := v0(ω2 + x)x and U(x) := u0(ω1 − x)x.
In the absence of sunspot activity in the model, the equilibrium price at date
t, xt, is determined, given x
e
t+1, the price that is expected to prevail at date t + 1,
according to the following first order condition:
V (xet+1) = U(xt). (7)
As indicated in Section 2, the correspondenceH can be generated by considering, for
each x, the values of xet+1 such that (7) holds. Let A := {(x,H(x))}; A is obtained
by reflecting the agents’ oﬀer curve with respect to the vertical axis. Under A.1, U
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is a monotone increasing function and both U and V are diﬀerentiable. This ensures
that A is the graph of a diﬀerentiable function with the second coordinate as the
independent variable. Furthermore, there is a unique x¯ > 0 such that (x¯, x¯) ∈ A, i.e.,
a positive steady state which happens to be unique under A.1. There is a “second”
steady state, autaraky.
By applying Proposition 1, we show that under A.1 FSE always exist since
the existence of a invariant self-fulfilling belief function is guaranteed. For ease of
exposition we consider diferent classes of economies.
For the first class of economies, we assume that the oﬀer curve is monotone. This
requires that V be monotone increasing or that
V 0(x) = v0(ω2 + x) + xv00(ω2 + x) > 0.
A.2: 1 ≥ −xv00(ω2+x)
v0(ω2+x)
for all x > 0.
It is well known that, under A.1 and A.2, the correspondence H is single valued
hence a function which we denote h; D := [0, x¯], where x¯ is the unique monetary
steady state, with h is the required pair which gives an invariant self-fulfilling belief
function. Note that if we were to set D = [0, x], with x > x¯, then the invariance
property is lost; however, D = [0, x] with x¯ ≥ x does satisfy the invariance require-
ment. Similarly, if we set D = [a, x] for 0 < a < x, the invariance property is
lost.
Corollary 2: (gross substitutes economies) Let A.1 and A.2 hold. For any Π which
is singular, FSE exist with D := [0, x] with x¯ ≥ x, and h defined by, for each x ∈ D,
h(x) =: x˜ where V (x˜) = U(x).
As we pointed out in the introduction, FSSE do not exist under A.2.
While Corollary 2 establishes the existence of FSE, it does not provide informa-
tion about the possible shapes of the various h(·; s) functions that may appear as
solutions to the system of equations that define FSE. In Example 1 below we specify
a particularly simple type of FSE with N = 2 where, in the first state, the state
variable moves towards the monetary steady state and in the second state, towards
the autarkic one. Specifically, we take D := [0, x¯] and N = 2 and obtain solutions
h(·; s), s = 1, 2, with the property that the two functions lie on either side of the 45
degree line through the origin so that under the action of h(·; 1), the state variable
is pulled towards the monetary steady state x¯, while under the action of h(·; 2), it is
pulled towards the autarkic steady state x = 0. We obtain these solution functions
in a straight forward constructive manner. It should be clear though that these
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are by no means the only possible specifications. The model admits other shapes
of these functions that need not be monotone and hence the dynamic laws may be
more complex than those outlined in Example 1.
Example 1: Assume A.1 and A.2. Fix h(·; 1) defined on D = [0, x¯] satisfying
h(0; 1) = 0, h(x¯; 1) = x¯, h(x; 1) > x for all x ∈ (0, x¯), h(·; 1) is strictly increasing,
and diﬀerentiable around 0 (from the right). It follows that limx→0h0(x; 1) > 0. h
which solves (4) is also increasing, x ≥ h(x) for all x ∈ [0, x¯], and diﬀerentiable
around 0 (from the right) with limx→0h
0(x) > 0 (since we are in the Samuelson
case). It follows that V (h(x)) < V (h(x; 1)) for all x ∈ (0, x¯) since V is increasing
under A.2. Choose π ∈ (0, 1) such that V (h(x)) ≥ πV (h(x; 1)) for all x ∈ [0, x¯].
Clearly, such a π exists since
limx→0
V (h(x))
V (h(x;1))
= limx→0
V 0(h(x))h0(x)
V 0(h(x;1))h0(x;1) = limx→0
h0(x)
h0(x;1) > 0.
It follows that
V (h(x)) ≥ V (h(x))−πV (h(x;1))
1−π ≥ 0 for all x ∈ [0, x¯].
Set h(x; 2) := V −1
µ
V (h(x))−πV (h(x;1))
1−π
¶
for all x ∈ [0, x¯]; by the inequality above,
h(·; 2) is well defined. It is immediate that h(0; 2) = 0 and h(x¯; 2) = x¯, since
we know that h(0) = h(0; 1) = 0 and h(x¯) = h(x¯; 1) = x¯. From (6), h(·; 1) and
h(·; 2) constitute an FSE if πV (h(x; 1)) + (1 − π)V (h(x; 2)) = V (h(x)) for all x ∈
[0, x¯]; we have constructed an FSE since h(·; 2) was defined so as to satisfy the
equation. We now show that h(x; 2) < h(x) for all x ∈ (0, x¯). Since h and h(·; 1)
are increasing functions and h(x; 1) > h(x) for all x ∈ (0, x¯) by construction, and V
is an increasing function, one has V (h(x; 1)) > V (h(x)); hence, by (6), V (h(x; 2)) <
V (h(x)) which implies in turn that h(x; 2) < h(x) for all x ∈ (0, x¯). Finally, note
that the construction imposes a very mild condition on limx→0h
0(x; 1); the derivative
could exceed one thus ensuring nonconvergence to the autarkic steady state.
We turn to the case where A.2 does not hold. The oﬀer curve must bend back-
wards and there exists x∗ ∈ (0,ω1) such that V (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ [0, x∗]. H is no
longer a function; instead one uses two (or more if necessary) functions, h+ and h−,
where h+(x∗) = h−(x∗). If h+(x∗) ≥ x∗ then Corollary 2 goes through unchanged
(this is the case in which the oﬀer curve bends “late” and the steady state is on
the “lower” branch, h+(x¯) = x¯). If instead h+(x∗) < x∗, so that the oﬀer curve
bends “early” and the steady state is on the “upper” branch, h−(x¯) = x¯, then
one possibility is to modify the construction by setting D := [0, x∗] and choosing a
selection from H which is invariant–there are various possibilities, e.g. (i) choose
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h+, (ii) choose h+ on [0, xˆ] and h− on (xˆ, x∗] where xˆ is such that V (x∗) = U(xˆ).
Corollary 3: (backward bending oﬀer curves) Let A.1 hold. For any Π which is
singular, FSE exist with (i) D := [0, x] with x¯ ≥ x, if x∗ ≥ x¯, or with (ii) D :=
[0, x∗]. In either case h can be specified to make D invariant.
The solutions described in Corollaries 2 and 3 have the property that they cannot
be bounded away from the autarchic steady state.12 This leads us to ask if there
are other solutions where the dynamics of the state variable are confined to some
neighbourhood of the monetary steady state and bounded away from the autarkic
steady state. The answer is yes: An invariant self-fulfilling belief function exists
around the monetary steady state if and only if a cycle of period two exists. Here
one can set D := [x1, x2], where 0 < x1 < x2 < x
∗ are the values of the state variable
along the two cycle. It is known that under an additional nondegenracy assumption
regarding the two cycle, the stated condition is also necessary and suﬃcient for the
existence of FSSE under A.1.13 So FSE can exist when a critical cycle of period two
exists, a case where FSSE need not exist.
Corollary 4: (backward bending oﬀer curves) Let A.1 hold. For any Π which is
singular, FSE with the property that the dynamics of the state variable are confined
to an interval around the monetary steady state and bounded away from the autarkic
steady state exist if and only if a cycle of period two exists.
We can now discuss the relation of FSE with earlier work on sunspots within
the OLG framework. As indicated in our discussion at the end of Section 2.2, the
existence of FSSE requires a particular kind of invariant set for the deterministic
dynamics. The easiest way to meet the requirement is to posit that the steady state
be indeterminate in the forward dynamics. Examples of such results are Azariadis
and Guesnerie (1986), Grandmont (1986) and Guesnerie (1986). Corollary 4 shows
that FSE also obtain under the same circumstances and for an additional nongeneric
case to boot. However, FSE obtain far more generally as Corollaries 2 and 3 have
shown.
The random walk equilibria introduced by Chiappori and Guesnerie (1993) are
very diﬀerent compared to FSSE and they too can exist in the gross substitutes
case. Though they behave like the FSE in Example 1, the conditions for existence of
random walk are somewhat diﬀerent. More importantly, we feel that the constructive
12Many of the sunspot equilibria discussed in Woodford (1994) have the same feature.
13See Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986) or Grandmont (1986).
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proof of our Proposition 1 together with the additional details provided in Example
1 are much easier to follow. We prefer to view FSE as a much simpler approach to
obtaining random walk type behaviour.
3.2 The Linear Case
In this section we consider the special case that arises when the function that
links the current value of the state variable with its forecasted value is linear. The
simpler specification makes it easier to follow the analysis of Section 2.
It is convenient to work with a function in deviations of the state variable from its
unique steady state value, which is denoted x. The function is accordingly expressed
as
xt = ax
e
t+1 (8)
where 0 is the unique steady state of the system. Set k := a−1; k determines the
stability of the perfect foresight dynamics associated with the map (8).
In the deterministic case, a typical agent’s beliefs will be assumed to be described
by a function h(x) = βx. Since the information available to the agent at date t
includes all realizations of the state variable up to and including t − 1, the agent
iterates twice on the belief h to generate the forecast
xet+1(xt−1) = β
2xt−1. (9)
By combining (8) and (9), the actual dynamics of the system are obtained
xt = aβ
2xt−1.
In this case self-fulfilling belief functions are the fixed points, in β, of the function
Ω(β) = aβ2. Ω has two roots, β¯1 = 0, β¯2 = 1a which are the two self-fulfilling belief
functions.
With extrinsic uncertainty described by a finite state Markov process, the belief
functions take the form h(xt−1; s) = βsxt−1. With our information structure, one
obtains the following forecasting rule given that st = s
xet+1(xt−1; s) =
hPN
j=1 πsjβjβs
i
xt−1, s = 1, · · · , N. (10)
The natural consistency requirement that the state dependent belief functions
be self-fulfilling takes a very simple form obtained by combining (10) with (8):
βsxt−1 = a
hPN
j=1 πsjβjβs
i
xt−1, s = 1, · · · , N ,
which, because of the linear framework, can be expressed solely in terms of the
beliefs β as
k =
hPN
j=1 πsjβj
i
, s = 1, · · · , N.
Since Π is a stochastic matrix,
PN
j=1 πsj = 1 for all s = 1, · · · , N . It follows that the
system of equations which we wish to solve is
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Π · [k1N − β] = 0N , (11)
where, 1N is a column vector of 1s, and 0N is a column vector of 0s.
Propositions 1 and 2 apply since R is an invariant set and k 6= 0.
To see how FSE can be constructed, suppose that Π is singular. As in the proof
of Proposition 1, there exists a vector z ∈ RN , z 6= 0N , such that Π · z = 0N and
zi 6= zj for some i, j. Define β∗s := zs + k. β∗ solves the system of equations (11)
and has the property that βi 6= βj for some i, j.
We can also construct solutions using Π as the variable that one solves for.
Trivially, the perfect foresight root β¯2 = k solves (11). Fix any collection of values
of βs, s = 1, · · · , N , βi 6= βj, i, j = 1, · · ·N , and let eβ and bβ denote respectively
the smallest and largest of these N values. If the perfect foresight root β¯2 satisfies
β˜ < β¯2 < bβ, one can solve for πij 6= 0, i, j = 1, · · · , N , such that (11) is satisfied.
The usual argument for the existence FSSE in the linear model is as follows:
Given Π, an N state FSSE is a tuple (x1, · · · , xN) such that
kxs =
P
j=1,···,N πsjxj, s = 1, · · · , N ,
which can also be written as
[k · IN −Π] · x = 0N , (12)
where IN is the N-dimensional identity matrix. It is known that solutions exist with
non-degenerate probabilities and with xi 6= xj for some i 6= j if and only if |k| < 1.14
By comparing (11) and (12) it should be clear that the conditions for existence of
the two kinds of equilibria are very diﬀerent. As noted earlier, FSE generate FSSE
as special cases when h(xt−1; s) = xs.
4. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we introduced FSE, an equilibrium concept that subsumes FSSE,
and demonstrated conditions under which they exist. We noted the extreme degree
of flexibility that one has in constructing FSE since h need not be continuous and the
set Z, the null space of Π, can be large. This shows once again that the requirement
of self-fulfilling beliefs in itself is very weak and far from letting one pin down
the equilibrium behaviour of economic systems.15 In our analysis, the multiplicity
is driven by the fact that the state variable is endogenous and is not tied down
suﬃciently by the fact that it is described by a function relating its value across
successive periods.
It remains to investigate the welfare properties of FSE under a conditional no-
tion of optimality and the precise connection between FSE and the general class
14When N = 2 this is very easy to check.
15Cass and Shell (1983) made the same point in their seminal work on sunspots.
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of sunspot equilibria studied by Woodford (1986), Chiappori and Guesnerie (1993)
and Woodford (1994). Given the large degree of multiplicity of FSE, it would also
be interesting to investigate whether any of these might be robust in the sense of
Goenka and Shell (1997), and which might be stable under adaptive learning rules.
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